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I.  Introduction 
             Extrinsic monetary rewards or sanctions are frequently used to 
promote cooperation in social dilemmas. Typical results suggest monetary 
sanctions effectively promote cooperation, with peer-to-peer sanctioning 
especially useful in mitigating free-riding behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 
At the same time, sanctioning mechanisms can adversely impact economic 
efficiency and lead to spirals of revenge (Sefton et al., 2007, Denant-Boemont 
et al. 2007)
1. While monetary reward can help to avoid such concerns, it is 
typically found to be less effective than sanctions at promoting cooperation 
(Andreoni etal. 2003, Sefton et al. 2007, Stoop et al. 2011); likewise, it is often 
found no more efficient than environments lacking sanctions (Jan et al. 2011). 
Yet another downside of monetary rewards and sanctions is that both may 
have a substantially detrimental impact on pro-social decisions when 
employed in competitive environments (Andreoni 1995; Fuster and Meier 
2010).  
In light of this, recently attention has turned to non-monetary 
incentives. Studies include Masclet et al. (2002), which reports that while non-
monetary sanctions have a positive initial impact on cooperation, the positive 
impact cannot be sustained (see also Noussair and Tucker, 2005). Also, Dugar 
(2007) shows that social approval is most effective when combined with the 
opportunity to express social disapproval
2. Aside from our own work in this 
area
3, however, we are unaware of any investigation into the impact of 
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
1 ﾠOther ﾠrelated ﾠpapers ﾠreporting ﾠdetrimental ﾠimpacts ﾠof ﾠsanction ﾠinclude ﾠbut ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠlimited ﾠ
to: ﾠGneezy ﾠand ﾠRustichini ﾠ2000, ﾠFehr ﾠand ﾠRochenbach ﾠ2003, ﾠNoussair ﾠet ﾠal ﾠ2007, ﾠDeber ﾠet ﾠal. ﾠ
2008, ﾠHouser ﾠet ﾠal. ﾠ2008, ﾠLi ﾠet ﾠal. ﾠ2009. ﾠ
2 ﾠRewards ﾠare ﾠfound ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠeffective ﾠin ﾠinfinitely ﾠrepeated ﾠinteractions ﾠ(Rand ﾠet ﾠal. ﾠ2009, ﾠAl-ﾭ‐
Ubaydli ﾠet ﾠal. ﾠ2010). ﾠAlso ﾠnote ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠBaseline ﾠtreatment ﾠwe ﾠreport ﾠbelow ﾠis ﾠmodeled ﾠafter ﾠ
ƵŐĂƌϮϬϬϳ͛Ɛ͞ĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů͟ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ͘ ﾠ
3 ﾠPan ﾠand ﾠHouser ﾠ(2011) ﾠreports ﾠthree ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠfour ﾠtreatments ﾠreported ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠpaper ﾠ(the ﾠnew ﾠ
ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĞ͞ƐƚĂƌ͟ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ͕ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚďĞůŽǁͿ͘dŚĞĞĂƌůŝĞƌƉĂƉĞƌĐŽŶŶĞĐƚƐƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐ
in ﾠour ﾠdata ﾠto ﾠtheories ﾠin ﾠevolutionary ﾠpsychology, ﾠwith ﾠan ﾠemphasis ﾠon ﾠgender ﾠeffects. ﾠThe ﾠ
present ﾠpaper ﾠpursues ﾠa ﾠvery ﾠdifferent ﾠapproach, ﾠanalyzing ﾠand ﾠinterpreting ﾠaggregate ﾠdata ﾠ
patterns ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠlens ﾠof ﾠeconomic ﾠtheory. ﾠLoosely ﾠspeaking, ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠpaper ﾠis ﾠinterested ﾠ3 
competition on cooperation in environments with non-monetary rewards (and 
in particular, social approval). 
Holländer (1990) provided an early and influential model of voluntary 
contributions under peer-to-peer approval
4. He showed that as long as social 
approval is sufficiently valued by participants, equilibria with positive 
contributions can exist. On the other hand, if approval is not sufficiently 
valued, then +ROOlQGHU¶Vmodel implies that zero cooperation is the unique 
Nash equilibrium. Consequently, for the purpose of institution design, it is 
crucial to know which environmental features might encourage people to 
assign high value to social approval. We focus on the possibility that this 
might occur in environments that include competition for social approval. 
So-FDOOHG³VLJQDOLQJPRWLYHV´DUHRQHRIWKHUHDVRQVWKDWWKHYDOXHRI
social approval might increase as a result of competition (see, e.g., Ariely et al. 
2009, Bénabou and Tirole 2003, Harbaugh 1998, Glazer and Konrad 1996).
5 
Drawing on signaling motives, RXUVWXG\FRPSOHPHQWV+ROOlQGHU¶VWKHRU\E\
providing empirical evidence that helps to clarify when and how competition 
can be used to promote the value of social approval, and thereby encourage 
pro-social behavior.  
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
in ﾠidentifying ﾠspecifically ﾠwho ﾠdid ﾠand ﾠdid ﾠnot ﾠrespond ﾠto ﾠspecific ﾠtreatment ﾠcontexts ﾠand ﾠ
then ﾠdeveloping ﾠan ﾠexplanation ﾠfor ﾠwhy; ﾠthe ﾠpresent ﾠpaper ﾠattempts ﾠto ﾠexplain ﾠaggregate ﾠ
behavior ﾠusing ﾠeconomic ﾠtheory ﾠthat ﾠmight ﾠgeneralize ﾠacross ﾠcontexts ﾠin ﾠa ﾠway ﾠthat ﾠinforms ﾠ
the ﾠdesign ﾠof ﾠinstitutions ﾠto ﾠpromote ﾠpro-ﾭ‐sociality. ﾠ
4 ﾠThis ﾠindirect ﾠmonitoring ﾠmechanism ﾠis ﾠalso ﾠproposed ﾠby ﾠArnott ﾠand ﾠStiglitz ﾠ(1991) ﾠwhere ﾠ
they ﾠargued ﾠfor ﾠits ﾠadvantages ﾠover ﾠalternative ﾠsystems ﾠin ﾠmitigating ﾠmoral ﾠhazard. ﾠThese ﾠ
other ﾠsystems ﾠinclude ﾠdirect ﾠmonitoring ﾠ(the ﾠprincipal ﾠmonitoring ﾠthe ﾠagents ﾠhimself), ﾠor ﾠ
supervision ﾠ(the ﾠprincipal ﾠhires ﾠa ﾠsupervisor ﾠto ﾠmonitor ﾠthe ﾠagents). ﾠ ﾠMoreover, ﾠthey ﾠargued ﾠ
for ﾠthe ﾠimportance ﾠof ﾠutility ﾠinterdependence ﾠamong ﾠeconomic ﾠagents ﾠto ﾠincentivize ﾠsuch ﾠ
peer ﾠmonitoring, ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠpresented ﾠhere ﾠas ﾠa ﾠpublic ﾠgoods ﾠgame. ﾠ ﾠ
5 ﾠůƐŽƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ͞image ﾠmotives,͟ƚŚe ﾠidea ﾠis ﾠthat ﾠan ﾠŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů͛ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌĐĂŶďĞ
directed ﾠby ﾠa ﾠdesire ﾠto ﾠcreate ﾠa ﾠgood ﾠimpression ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠeyes ﾠof ﾠothers. ﾠSignaling ﾠmotives ﾠhave ﾠ
been ﾠinvoked ﾠto ﾠexplain ﾠa ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠpro-ﾭ‐social ﾠbehaviors, ﾠincluding ﾠwhy ﾠcharities ﾠadvertise ﾠ
ƚŚĞŝƌĚŽŶŽƌƐ͛ŶĂŵĞƐ;,arbaugh ﾠ1998), ﾠwhy ﾠfootball ﾠteams ﾠplace ﾠhighly ﾠvisible ﾠemblems ﾠon ﾠ
the ﾠhelmets ﾠof ﾠhigh ﾠperformers ﾠ(Wired ﾠ2011), ﾠand ﾠwhy ﾠtop ﾠemployees ﾠare ﾠrewarded ﾠwith ﾠ
prizes, ﾠe.g., ﾠgold ﾠcups ﾠfor ﾠemployees ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠmonth. ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
 ﾠ4 
We analyze two-stage public goods games with various non-monetary 
prizes as rewards. Public goods games have been widely used to investigate 
behavior when self-interest conflicts with social-interest (Fehr and Gächter 
2000, Masclet et al. 2002, Noussair and Tucker 2007, Ledyard 1995). In our 
games, each player receives an identical monetary endowment. In the first 
stage, four players simultaneously select a fraction of the endowment to 
contribute to a group account, while keeping the remainder for themselves. All 
funds in the group account pay a positive return to each member of the group. 
In the second stage, each subject has an opportunity, after observing his/her 
JURXSPHPEHUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVWRDVVLJQQRQ-monetary approval points to each 
of his/her fellow group members. The approval points range from zero to ten 
and come at no cost to the subject.  
Our experiment includes four treatments. Baseline includes neither 
competition nor rewards. Subjects learn only the total approval they received 
from other group members in each round. The other three treatments include 
rewards and competition, and are named after the available reward. The Star 
treatment includes competition for electronic gold stars in each period. As in 
Baseline, subjects learn the total approval they received; however, they also 
learn whether they earned the most approval. The subject who earns the most 
approval receives an electronic gold star. The Ice-cream and Mug treatments 
are identical to Star except that each gold star increases the probability of 
receiving a final reward by ten percentage points. The rewards in these two 
treatments are a Häggen-Dazs ice-cream bar or mugs emblazoned with our 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VORJR, respectively. Note that the mug, which can later be shown 
to others, has a signaling value that electronic stars and ice-cream bars lack.  
              Our key finding is that competition for social approval promotes 
cooperation only when winners receive non-cash rewards with signaling value 
(the Mug). Moreover, our data reveal that approval is dispensed differently 
under different final rewards, and in a way that is consistent with Holländer 5 
(1990). In particular, we show that HolläQGHU¶VPRGHOSUHGLFWVWKDWDUHZDUG
with signaling value can lead to approval being assigned based more on 
relative rather than absolute contributions, and further predicts increased 
contribution in equilibrium as a result of enhanced utility derived from 
approval received. Our data is consistent with both of these predictions. 
Further, we find that a non-cash reward with the same monetary value but no 
signaling value is unable to instantiate a competition. Therefore, both approval 
assignment and contributions present a similar pattern in relation to the 
Baseline treatment without competition or rewards. HolläQGHU¶VPRGHODOVR
predicts that this should be the case. The reason is that in this environment, 
approval should have little or no social value, and is thus unable to initiate an 
increase in contribution.  
             This paper takes a step toward a better understanding of alternatives to 
monetary incentives for promoting cooperation by examining how competition 
for non-monetary social approval impacts pro-social behaviors in a social 
dilemma experiment. Additionally, our investigation informs how different 
rewards out of competition impact peerV¶ decisions on how to award approval. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
introduces our extension of HolläQGHU¶VWKHRUHWLFDOPodel, which 
concludes that status orientation and the weight given to approval utility are 
two key factors influencing that rate of social approval and the level of 
cooperation in equilibrium. Section 3 describes our experiment design, which 
varies the incentives that influence these two major factors. Section 4 
describes our hypotheses, namely how the incentives we introduce may impact 
equilibrium. Section 5 reports our results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and 




2.  The Mo de l 
              This paper investigates how social approval impacts behavior in 
various competitive environments. Our comparison between treatments 
focuses on: (i) how people respond to contributions with approval; and (ii) 
how people respond to approval with contributions. 
Our investigation is guided by Holländer (1990), which describes 
voluntary cooperation as a function of social approval. Broadly speaking, his 
model provides a mechanism that transforms the receipt of social approval 
into voluntary cooperation. It is worth noting that this perspective contrasts 
with frameworks that focus on the impact of social pressure or sanctions in 
depressing free-riding (see, e.g., Kandel and Lazear, 1992) 
     Holländer (1990) posits that an agent obtains approval from 
neighbours, colleagues, acquaintances, etc. This is the reference group of the 
respective agent and is assumed to be of equal size for all agents.  Given that 
the model assumes only symmetric behaviour, the amount of approval 
received from a typical member of the reference group is an index of total 
approval received. Let ܣሺ݃௜ሻ be a monotonically increasing function 
representing total approval received for contribution ݃௜. People have 
preferences regarding both the level of approval received and the relative 
approval ܣሺ݃௜ሻ െ ܣሺܩҧሻ, where ܣሺܩҧሻ is approval associated with the average 
behavior. Preferences are assumed to be additive in these two factors, with 
respective weights ሺͳ െ ߙሻ and ߙ. This implies that utility for approval is 
given by: 
(1)              ܷሺܣሺ݃௜ሻሻ ൌ ܣሺ݃௜ሻ െ ߙܣሺܩҧሻ Ͳ ൑ ߙ ൑ ͳ 
      Total utility is assumed to depend not only on approval, but also on 
additively separable components. This is due to consumption of private and 
public goods. Departing sliJKWO\IURP+ROOlQGHU¶VQRWDWLRQZHZHLJKW these 
components according to non-QHJDWLYHFRQVWDQWV³ߠ௜´ZKLch sum to one 7 
(without loss of generality). While these weights are not explicitly specified in 
Holländer (1990), it is convenient for the purpose of our analysis to do so. 
     Thus, the utility function for person i is as follows: 
(2) ܷ௜ ൌ ߠ௣ܷ௣ሺߨ െ ݃௜ሻ ൅ ߠீҧܷሺܩҧሻ ൅ ߠ஺ܷ஺ሺܣሻͲ ൑ ݃௜ߨ 
ߠ௣ ൅ ߠீҧ ൅ ߠ஺ ൌ ͳ 
Note that in our proofs below, as in Holländer (1990), we assume 
monotonicity and concavity of the utility function. We further assume that the 
absolute elasticity of ܷᇱሺܣሻ is smaller than one.  
Having specified preferences, we turn now to the process by which 
approval is received. We first define the subjective value of a unit 
contribution, w, as WKH³DSSURYDOUDWH´Then, we assume total approval is 
determined by a weighted average of absolute ݓ݃௜and comparative ݓሺ݃௜ െ ܩҧሻ 
components, with corresponding weights ሺͳ െ ߚሻ and ߚǤ  It follows that the 
amount of approval received is determined by:  
ሺ͵ሻܣ௜ ൌ ݓሺ݃௜ െ ߚܩҧ)             where Ͳ ൑ ߚ ൑ ͳ. 
Then, by substituting (3) into (1), we can express utility for approval as 
a function of the approval rate, person i¶VFRQWULEXWLRn, and the average 
contribution, as follows:  
ሺͶሻܷሺܣሺ݃௜ሻሻ ൌ ݓሺ݃௜ െ ߪ
 ഥሻͲ ൑ ɐ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ െ ߙߚ ൑ ͳ  
The coefficient ߪ is important for our purposes below, and indicates 
the strength of the externality stemming from the average contribution. One 
can think of ߪ DV³VWDWXVRULHQWDWLRQ´: when others contribute more, utility is 
reduced due to the fact that RQH¶VRZQVWDWXVLVORZHU With this notation, 
utility can be expressed as:  
ሺʹሻԢܷ௜ ൌ ߠ௣ܷ௣ሺߨ െ ݃௜ሻ ൅ ߠீҧܷሺܩҧሻ ൅ ߠ஺ܷ஺ሺݓሺ݃௜ െ ߪ
 ഥሻሻͲ ൑
݃௜ߨ 8 
We turn now to the way people choose to send approval. Holländer 
(1990) hypothesizes that the individual approval rate ݒis equal to the marginal 
rate of substitution between endowment ߨ and average contribution ܩҧ with 
respect to the utility function (2).  ﾠ





,WIROORZVWKDWDQDJHQW¶VDSSURYDOUDWHLVhis subjective value of 
DQRWKHUDJHQW¶VPDUJLQDOFontribution.  
In +ROODQGHU¶VPRGHO, agents are rational actors. In particular, 
for given ܩҧܽ݊݀ݓ, an agent is assumed to choose ݃௜ in order to maximize 
utility. The inequality below characterizes optimal decisions, and holds with 
equality if ݃௜>0. 
(6)          ߠ௣ܷᇱ
௣ሺߨ െ ݃௜ሻ ൒ ݓߠ஺ܷᇱ
஺ሾݓሺ݃௜ െ ߪܩҧሻሿ 
We are now in a position to state and prove the following propositions.  
Proposition 1: Optimization defines an individual contribution function 
݃௜ሺݓǡߪܩҧǡߨሻwith (i)  ݃௜ ൐ Ͳ if and only if ܷᇱ
௣ሺߨሻ ൏ ݓ כ ሺߠ஺Ȁߠ௣ሻ כ
ܷᇱ
஺ሺെݓߪܩҧሻ and (ii) ݃Ԣ௪ǡ݃ԢԢఙீҧǡ݃Ԣగ ൐ Ͳܽ݊݀݃ԢԢఙீҧǡ݃Ԣగ ൏ ͳ݂݋ݎ݈݈ܽ݃ ൐ Ͳ. 
The first condition derives from the concavity assumption of the utility 
function. Ceteris paribus, a stronger status orientation (a bigger ߪ) will lead to 
higher individual contributions. Increased average contributions by others also 
increases contributions, in an effort to induce efforts to regain the status lost.  
Define a݃ܩҧ equilibrium to occur when each individual contribution is 
equal to the average contribution, in the sense that ܩҧ ൌ ݃௜ሺݓǡߪܩҧǡߨሻ. 







Exploiting the properties of the utility function, one then obtains: 9 
Proposition 2: In a ݃ܩҧ equilibrium, individual contributions and the supply of 
the collective good are a function ܩҧሺݓǡߪǡߨሻ with i) ܩҧ ൐ Ͳ if and only if 
ݓ ൐ ܷᇱ
௣ሺߨሻȀܷᇱ
஺ሺͲሻ and ii) ܩҧ௪ǡܩҧఙǡܩҧగ ൐ Ͳ.  
Next, define an approval (VW) equilibrium as occurring when 
aggregate approval rates equal individual behavior, so that ݒ ൌ ݓ. Substituting 
this condition into (6) into (5) and observing ݃௜ ൌ ܩҧǡݒ ൌ ݓ, one obtains the 
following: 




೛ሺగିீҧሻ െ ߪ                       
When both VW and gG equilibria exist simultaneously, we (like 
Holländer) say there is a ³VRFLDOH[FKDQJH´HTXLOLEULXPVHH)LJXUH 
 






























െ ߪ ﾠ10 
Figure 1 demonstrates the existence of unique social equilibrium e1*. 
The figure depicts how an increase in ߪ, status orientation, and an increase in 
ߠ஺, the weight of utility derived from received approval, affects equilibrium. 
In general, an increase in ߪleads to a decrease in the approval rate w, and has 
an ambiguous affect on equilibrium contributions. This is represented in 
Figure 1 by a change from e1* to the new equilibrium e2*. An increase in ߠ஺ 
alone necessarily results in higher equilibrium contributions, causing ݃ܩҧ to 
shift right to ݃ܩҧଶ, resulting in lower approval rate at e3*. While the effect of 
an increased ıhas either positive or negative effect on contributions in 
equilibrium, an increase in ߠ஺ has an unambiguously positive impact on 
equilibrium contributions.  
Proposition 3: The effect of increased ߪ on equilibrium is to decrease the 
approval rate in equilibrium while having an ambiguous impact on 
contribution.  
     Suppose there is an increase in ߪ. The VW curve will shift 
downward by ȟߪ to VW1, and ݃ܩҧ  will pivot clockwise at ܩҧ ൌ Ͳ, to ݃ܩҧʹǤThis 
will lead to a smaller w* (approval rate) in equilibrium. Depending on the 
movement of ݃ܩҧ, the level of new contribution in equilibrium  ܩҧͳכ remains 
unclear. If it pivots clockwise, then the new equilibrium e2* has the same 
contribution level as the old equilibrium e1*. Yet, if  ݃ܩҧ curve pivots less or 
further clockwise, then the new contribution in equilibrium will be either 
smaller or bigger than the previous contribution in equilibrium. 
Proposition 4: The effect on equilibrium of an increase in ߠ஺ is to increase the 
level of contributions and to decrease the approval rate.  
                Increasing the weight of approval on overall utility results in the 
slope of the ݃ܩҧ curve becoming flatter at any given ܩҧ. This leads to a 
clockwise pivot of the ݃ܩҧ curve. Also, a reduced ratio 
ఏ೛
ఏೌ
 generates a 
downward shift of the curve. It is clear that both of these effects lead to an 11 
increase in equilibrium contributions ܩҧכand to a decrease in the equilibrium 
approval rate w*.   
Proposition 5: For given ߨ and ߪ, there exists a unique social equilibrium 












                  This is the condition which allows the VW and ݃ܩҧ curve to 
intersect. If: (i) the marginal utility from private good at endowment ܷᇱ
௣ሺߨሻ is 
still too big; (ii) the marginal utility from approval at initial zero ܷᇱ
஺ሺͲሻ is too 
small; or (iii) the marginal utility from public goods at initial zero ܷᇱ
ீҧሺͲሻ is 
still small, then we would not expect to observe the social equilibrium 
exchange between contribution and approval. 
     It is worthwhile to further discuss the impact of status orientation 
ıDQGWKHZHLJKWRQDSSURYDOXWLOLW\ߠ஺) on contributions and approval rate 
in equilibrium. Suppose there is an increase in both ߠ஺ and ı; if an increase of 
ı has positive impact on contribution in equilibrium, then we would expect the 
effect of ı and ߠ஺ influence the equilibrium in the same direction, leading to a 
lower approval rate and an increased contribution.  On the other hand, if an 
increase of ı has negative impact on contributions in equilibrium, then the 
overall equilibrium change in contributions depends on which effect is greater. 
In either case, the approval rate is predicted to be lower in equilibrium.  
    Our experiment design informs the theoretical results described by 
the propositions. In particular, as detailed in the next section, one of our 
treatments influences RQO\ı (Star), while others impact both ıDQGߠ஺ (Mug 




3. Experiment Design 
                Motivated by Holländer (1990), the goal of our design is to 
exogenously vary competition and signaling incentives (see, e.g., Ariely et al. 
2009) to discover whether they influence the utility value of social approval. 
Our mechanism for doing this involves the use of non-cash rewards with small 
monetary value. This is a widely-adopted approach that has been found 
effective in the cooperation literature (Lacetera and Macis 2010).  
  We use a two-stage linear public good experiment with various 
reward conditions. The first treatment, the Baseline treatment, includes neither 
competition nor signaling incentives. We introduce competition in the Star 
treatment. The Mug and Ice-cream treatments include both competition and a 
final reward with small (and equal
6) monetary value. The key difference 
between the Mug and Ice-cream treatments is that the Mug reward is unique 
and durable, while the ice-cream bar is generic and non-durable. 
Consequently, the mug reward has signaling value, and the ice-cream bar does 
not. 
Table 1. Features of experimental sessions 
Treatments  Competition  Monetary Value  Signaling value  Number of groups 
Baseline  No  No  No  12 groups of size 4 
Star  Yes  No  No  12 groups of size 4 
Ice-cream  Yes  Yes  No  12 groups of size 4 
Mug  Yes  Yes  Yes  14 groups of size 4 
 
 
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
6 ﾠWe ﾠconducted ﾠa ﾠwillingness-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐pay ﾠelicitation ﾠto ﾠĂƐƐĞƐƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ͛ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞǀĂůƵĞĨŽƌ
the ﾠtwo ﾠrewards. ﾠAs ﾠdescribed ﾠbelow, ﾠwe ﾠfound ﾠthe ﾠvalues ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠstatistically ﾠ(and ﾠnearly ﾠ
pointwise) ﾠidentical. ﾠ ﾠ13 
3.1. The Baseline Treatment:  
              In the Baseline treatment, participants play ten periods of a public 
good game in fixed groups of four. In each period, each group member  
݅߳ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡͶሽ receives an endowment of 20 Experimental Dollars (E$) and can 
contribute any integer amount between 0 and 20 ሺͲ ൑ ݃௜ ൑ ʹͲሻto a public 
JRRGUHIHUUHGWRDVD³JURXSSURMHFW´). All group members decide 
simultaneously on their ݃௜each period. The monetary payoff of each 
individual ݅ from the group project each period is given by  
ߨ௜
ଵ ൌ ሺʹͲ െ ݃௜ሻ ൅ ݉σ ݃௝
ସ
௝ୀଵ                                           (1) 
where ݉ is the marginal per capita return from each 1E$ contribution to the 
public good. Following the previous literature (Fehr and Gächter 1999, Maslet 
et al. 2002), ݉ is set to equal to 0.4. For each participant, the cost of 
contributing 1E$ to the public good is 0.6 E$, while the total benefit to his/her 
fellow group members is 1.2 E$. Therefore, it is always in DSDUWLFLSDQW¶V 
material self-interest to invest 0 E$, regardless of the contributions of the 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶V group members. At the same time, the group¶V payoff is 
maximized if all group members contribute their full endowment.  
               After group members have privately made their own contribution 
decisions, they are then shown the contribution decisions of each of their 
group members. Next, subjects are able to assign approval ratings to each of 
their group members. The ratings can be any integer value from 0 to 10, with 0 
indicating the least approval and 10 indicating the greatest. All approval 
decisions are made simultaneously and subjects are unable to assign approval 
to themselves. Sending approval is not costly and, in this treatment, has no 
impact on the final earnings of the receiver. 
3.2 Reward Treatments 
            The Star treatment differs from the Baseline in that after the approval 
assignment, an electronic gold star is given to the participant with the highest 14 
approval ratings from his/her group members. In case of a tie, all of the most 
highly-approved subjects earn a gold star. Thus, each subject can receive up to 
ten stars over ten periods. At the end of each period, subjects are informed of 
(i) the accumulated gold stars they have earned (in the format of electronic 
gold stars displayed on top of their screen); (ii) the total approval they have 
received; (iii) the contribution of gold star winners that round; (iv) their own 
contribution; and (v) their current and accumulated monetary pay-off. While 
subjects are informed of accumulated approval received, they know nothing 
about the approval points received from any specific member. This rules out 
any targeted reciprocal or spiteful behaviors. 
            Participants who have been winners in multiple periods will have 
several gold stars displayed on their screens. It is important to emphasize, 
however, that the gold stars in the Star treatment do not lead to any final 
reward for the star-winners.  Therefore, as in the Baseline treatment, it is in 
HDFKVXEMHFW¶VPDWHULDOVHOI-interest to contribute E$ each period, regardless of 
the contributions of others. 
            The Mug and Ice-cream treatments are identical to Star except that a 
chance of winning a final reward is proportional to the number of stars won 
over the ten periods, with each additional star increasing the chance of 
winning the final reward by ten percentage points. Thus, a person with zero 
gold stars at the end of the game has a zero percent chance of winning the 
award, while a person with ten gold stars wins the award with certainty. 
           In Mug and Ice-cream, participants have an added incentive to 
contribute, but our willingness-to-pay elicitation suggests these incentives are 
small and identical between reward treatments (see details in Section 2.4). 
Thus, the Nash equilibrium strategy would still be to contribute nothing to the 
public good. Nevertheless, if subjects place sufficient pecuniary value on the 
rewards, it becomes evident that positive contributions could be consistent 
with the Nash equilibrium in reward treatments. Any such pecuniary effects 15 
would be identical between reward treatments and therefore could not explain 
between-treatment differences. 
            Comparing the Star  and Baseline treatments measures the effects of 
competition per se (pure symbolic rewards) on overall cooperation. In 
particular, it measures how the presence of competition alone affects social 
approval, and how people respond to such shift. Comparing the approval 
assignment and the corresponding contributions between the Star and Ice-
cream or Mug treatments helps us understand whether providing additional 
rewards with low monetary value and/or signaling value influences the 
assignment of social approval. In particular, we are able to discover whether 
the signaling incentive enhances the value of received approval, thereby 
promoting cooperation.   
2.3 Procedures     
             A total of 200 students from George Mason University participated in 
our public goods experiment at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic 
Science. The experiment used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
            Upon entering the laboratory, each subject was seated in a carrel 
separated from other subjects in a way that ensured anonymity. All 
interactions in the experiment took place anonymously. Participants then 
received written instructions. After the experimenter read the instructions 
aloud, participants were quizzed to ensure they understood the procedures and 
the payoff structure. The experiment did not proceed until each subject had 
completed the quiz successfully.  
             Participants who earned stars in the Mug or Ice-cream treatments had 
the opportunity to draw once from a deck of ten cards, numbered 1 through 10. 
Subjects would receive the reward if the number they drew was equal to or 
smaller than the number of stars they earned during the experiment. The 
experimenter distributed the reward, along with the cash payment, to each 16 
subject privately. The experiments lasted 45-50 minutes, and on average 
subjects earned $16.00 per session.  
2.4 Willingness-to-pay (WTP) Elicitation 
              We  recruited  30  students  who  had  not  participated  in  the  µSXEOLF
goods¶  experiment  to  take  part  in  the  WTP  elicitation.  This  experiment 
adopted the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
22 random auction mechanism to elicit 
WTP for the ICES mug and the Haagen-Dazs ice-cream bar. Subjects were 
endowed with $10. The prices of the auctioned items ranged from $0 to $10 in 
increments  of  $0.50.  The  maximum  value  $10  exceeded  their  maximum 
expected WTP and the minimum $0 was at least equal to their WTP. Subjects 
in the WTP experiment were provided with the same information about the 
auctioned items as subjects in the respective reward treatments of the µpublic 
goods¶ game. We find that the WTPs are statistically identical between ice-
creams (mean=1.7) and mugs (mean=2.2, n=30, P=0.501, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test). 
4. Hypothes es 
Hypothesis 1: Approval rate will be lowest in the Mug treatment, followed 
by the Ic e -cream and Star treatments, and highest in the Baseline 
treatment.  
            The above arguments demonstrate that if we assume the 
competitiveness of the environment is positively related to the monetary value 
of the reward, then rewards with higher monetary value should result in an 
increase in both ߪܽ݊݀ߠ஺, leading to a reduction in equilibrium approval rate. 
In our experiment, monetary values of the rewards are ordered as follows: 
mug=ice-cream
7>star=baseline. This implies that ߪܽ݊݀ߠ஺ are ordered 
according to ߪ௠௨௚ ൌ ߪ௜௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൐ ߪ௦௧௔௥ ൌ ߪ஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘ , and similarly for ߠ஺, 
where ߠ௠௨௚ ൌ ߠ௜௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൐ ߠ௦௧௔௥ ൌ ߠ஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘. Given that an increase in 
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
7 ﾠOur ﾠWTP ﾠelicitation ﾠillustrates ﾠthat ﾠsubjects ﾠdisplayed ﾠstatistically ﾠidentical ﾠwillingness-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐
pay ﾠfor ﾠmug ﾠand ﾠice-ﾭ‐cream. ﾠ17 
either factor leads to a decrease in the approval rate, we expect approval rates 
to follow a reversed order: ݓெ௨௚ ൌ ݓூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൏ ݓௌ௧௔௥ ൌ ݓ஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘. The 
equality between the Star and Baseline treatments can become a strict 
inequality if participants SUHIHUHQFHV¶respond to competition itself, thus 
triggering a stronger status orientation than Baseline,ߪ௦௧௔௥ ൐ ߪ஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘ or an 
increased weight placed on approval utility, ߠ௦௧௔௥ ൐ ߠ஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘ or both. Any of 
these changes would cause a change in the approval rate, therefore resulting in 
a lower approval rate in equilibrium than in Baseline, ݓௌ௧௔௥ ൏ ݓ஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘. At 
the same time, if the mug reward further triggers the signaling motives, then 
we would expect a strictly stronger status orientation in Mug than in the Ice-
cream treatment, ߪ௠௨௚ ൐ ߪ௜௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠Ǣ or we would expect additional weight to 
be added to approval utility, ߠ௠௨௚ ൐ ߠ௜௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠, or both. Together, an 
increase in either of these two parameters will lead to a decrease in the 
approval rate in equilibrium, thus  ݓெ௨௚ ൏ ݓூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ would follow. 
Therefore, after taking into the account of signalling value and competition, 
we have: 
ܪ଴ǣݓெ௨௚ ൑ ݓூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൏ ݓௌ௧௔௥ ൑ ݓ஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘ 
The next hypotheses are based on Proposition 4 above. While 
increased competitiveness increases both ߪ and ߠ஺ , both of which reduce 
approval rate w in equilibrium, their aggregate influence on contributions is 
uncertain. In particular, while an increased ߠ஺ serves to promote contributions, 
an increase in ߪ may have either a positive or negative impact on contributions 
(Propositions 3 & 4). 
Hypothesis 2A: Suppose that increasing ࣌, the status orientation, leads to 
increased cooperation. Then contributions in Mug should be greatest, 
followed by Ic e -Cream, then Star and finally Baseline.  
             If increasing ߪ has a positive effect on contributions, then competition 
will only increase cooperation, so that contributions will exceed Baseline in all 18 
treatments: ݃ெ௨௚ǡ݃ூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ǡ݃ௌ௧௔௥ ൐ ݃஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘. With added monetary value 
in both Mug and Ice-cream, and the unique signaling effect only in Mug, we 
would expect an enhanced value of both ߪ and ߠ, with ߪெ௨௚ ൐ ߪூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൐
ߪௌ௧௔௥ǡ and ߠெ௨௚ ൐ ߠூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൐ ߠௌ௧௔௥. Both promote contribution in the same 
direction; therefore 
 ܪଶ଴ǣ݃ெ௨௚ ൒ ݃ூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൐ ݃ௌ௧௔௥ ൐ ݃஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘. 
Hypothesis 2B: Suppose increasing ࣌ has a negative impact on 
cooperation. Then one of the following three outcomes will emerge: 
i)  If the positive effect of increased ߠ஺ on contributions can 
overwhelm the negative impact of increased ߪ, then either 
 ܪଶଵǣ݃ெ௨௚ ൒ ݃ூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൐ ݃ௌ௧௔௥ ൐ ݃஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘; or 
ii)           ܪଶଶǣ݃ெ௨௚ ൒ ݃ூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൐ ݃஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘ ൐ ݃ௌ௧௔௥; or  
iii)           ܪଶଷǣ݃ெ௨௚ ൐ ݃஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘ ൐ ݃ூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൒ ݃ௌ௧௔௥; or 
iv)           ܪଶସǣ݃஻௔௦௘௟௜௡௘ ൐ ݃ெ௨௚ ൒ ݃ூ௖௘ି௖௥௘௔௠ ൒ ݃ௌ௧௔௥ 
   ܪଶଵ maintains the same order a in ܪଶଵ. It assumes that either the 
signalling value in Mug, the monetary value in Ice-cream or the competition in 
Star induces a stronger positive influence from a change in ߠ஺ than does the 
negative influence from a change in  . ܪଶଶoccurs when competition alone 
(Star) induces a stronger negative effect from increase in ߪ than the positive 
effect from an increase in ߠ஺;  Similarly, ܪଶଷ occurs when not only the 
competition fails, but also the monetary value fails to generate enough 
approval weight on ߠ஺. Or, as in ܪଶସ, none of these effects is sufficient to 
induce enough weight on approval utility. This means the positive impact from 
ߠ஺ fails to elicit further contributions due to the negative effect of ߪǤ It follows 
that, in this scenario, contribution in Baseline exceed all other treatments.  19 
5. Results  ﾠ
Result 1a.  Approval assignment depends on relative contribution 
differences in treatments with competition.  
             We find that across treatments, the level of approval assigned by one 
individual to another is: (i) decreasing in the difference between the 
contributions of the approval sender and approval receiver; and (ii) decreasing 
in the difference between the contribution of the approval receiver and the 
average contribution of the other group members. This is shown in Figure 2 
below, which demonstrates that for all treatments, as the difference (݃௜ െ ݃௞) 
increases, person i assigns less approval to ݇. This effect is particularly 
apparent when the difference (݃௜ െ ݃௞) is positive. The next result provides a 
more formal analysis of the data that underlie Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Approval assigned from i to k in response to contribution 
differences between i and k. Given the same contribution differences, approval 
was assigned most in Baseline. While the other three treatments do not appear 
to differ in general, in the [-5,0], [0] and [0,5] category, approval given was 
lowest in the Star treatment.  
Result 1b. Given the same relative contribution (differences), approval is 










































Contribution ﾠdifferences ﾠbetween ﾠi ﾠand ﾠk ﾠ(gi-ﾭ‐ gk)
Baseline Star Mug Ice-ﾭ‐cream20 
                 A regression of the approval person i assigned to k in period t on 
contribution differences between person i and k in the same period confirms 
the findings represented in Figure 2 after controlling the differences between 
person k and the average contribution of the other group members.  
ܣ௜௞
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  Table 2 describes the results of this regression. The main finding is 
that approval assigned is lower in reward treatments than in Baseline. Star has 
the smallest estimated coefficient (-1.68 and significant), while Mug has the 
least negative (-0.56, and statistically insignificant). This indicates that given 
the same contribution differences, participants withhold the most approval 
points in Star. This is consistent with Figure 2 where we see the line for Star  
lower than its counterparts.Likewise, the asymmetric pattern revealed in 
Figure 2 is also confirmed in the regression results. Table 2 clearly shows that 
while person i sends significantly less approval to those who contributed less 
than him/her, he/she does not send significantly more to those who contributed 
more than him. Finally, from Table 2 one immediately sees that approval 
assignment increases (decreases) in the positive (negative) difference between 
the receiver and the average contribution of her other group members.  










Positive differences between i and k: ሼͲǡ݃௜ െ ݃௞ሽ  -0.179*** 21 
(.017) 
Negative differences between i and k: ሼͲǡ݃௞ െ ݃௜ሽ 
.009 
(.025) 















Period Dummies  Yes 
# of Obs.  6000 
Note: Dependent variable: Approval Points i received in period t, 
robust standard error clustered by individual   ﾠ ﾠ
 
             Result 1 shows that approval assignment is based on relative 
contributions in treatments that include competition. Result 2 (Table 3) reports 
estimates of the equation ܣ ൌ ݓሺ݃௜ െ ߚܩҧሻ
8. As detailed in Section 3, this 
equation takes into account both relative and absolute contributions.  
Result 2:  Approval rates are lowest in Mug and highest in Baseline.  
Table 3 provides the results of an estimation of approval rate w, as well 
as the assignment weight ߚ. We find that the approval rate in Mug (w=0.94) is 
significantly lower than the approval rate in Baseline (w=1.23, F=4.93, 
P=0.03). Approval rates in Star and Ice-cream are both lower than in Baseline, 
but do not significantly differ. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1 
above.  
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
8 ﾠIn ﾠthe ﾠtheoretical ﾠmodel, ﾠthe ﾠܩҧ ﾠis ﾠassumed ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠthe ﾠgroup ﾠaverage ﾠfor ﾠsimplicity ﾠand ﾠease ﾠ
of ﾠ ﾠ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͘,ĞƌĞ͕ǁĞĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞŐďĂƌĂƐĞƋƵĂůƚŽƚŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŽŶĞ͛ƐŐƌŽƵƉ
members. ﾠ ﾠ22 
Table 3: Estimation of approval rate ࢝ and the assignment weight ࢼ 













ߚ in Baseline 
0.133** 
(.063) 
ߚ in Mug 
0.161 
(.120) 
ߚ in Star 
0.216*** 
(.072) 






Period Dummies  Yes 
# of Obs.  2000 
Note: Dependent variable: Approval Points i received in period t, 
robust standard error clustered by group   ﾠ ﾠ
Result 3: Contributions are highest in Mug and lowest in Star. 
Overall contributions are significantly higher in Mug than any other 
treatment (Figure 3a). We further find that the Star treatment has the lowest 23 
level of contributions (falling even below Baseline). Moreover, the frequency 
of full contributions is highest in Mug. For example, from period 6 to 10, 48.2% 
of subjects in Mug contributed their entire endowment, while only 29.2% did 
so in Baseline and 18.8% in Ice-cream (Fig. 3b).   
A parametric analysis confirms these results. After controlling for 
group contributions and peirod effects, we find an unconditionally higher 
contribution in Mug  using a random effect GLS regression (the dummy for 
the Mug treatment is significant at 4.18, but insignificant for the other 
treatments). Being a star-winner in period t-1 also has a positive effect on 
period t contributions in all rewards treatments (significant at 1.4 in Mug and 
at 2.4 in Ice-cream).  
Overall then, we find support for hypothesis ܪଶଷ: the positive effect of 
increasing approval utility ߠ஺ driven by monetary value does not overwhelm 
the negative impact of increased status orientation ߪ due to increased 
competition, thus we observe a lower contribution in Ice-cream than Baseline . 
Yet, such negative impact is evidently more than offset by increases inߠ஺ 
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Mug ﾠ(14.1) Baseline ﾠ(11.7) Ice-ﾭ‐cream ﾠ(9.3) Star ﾠ(8.3)24 
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Figure 3. Contributions to the public good over 10 periods across 
treatments. Cooperation is highest in Mug both by a, average contribution, or 
b, frequency of the full contribution.  a. The numbers in parentheses indicate 
mean contribution (over 10 periods) for that treatment. Contributions are 
significantly higher in Mug (N=14 groups) compared to Ice-cream (N=12 
groups, z=2.675, P=0.008), Baseline (N=12 groups, z=-1.800, P=0.072), and 
Star (N=12 groups, z=3.138, P=0.002). Star is significnatly lower than 
Baseline (n=12 for both, z=2.079, P=0.038). b. The numbers in parentheses 
indicate mean frequency (over 10 periods) of full contributions in that 
treamtent. In the Mug treatment, most subjects contributed their full 
endowment (54%), significantly more than those in both Baseline (35%, N=12 
groups, z=-1.987, P=0.047) and Ice-cream (23%, z=2.734, P=0.006).  
6. Concluding Discussion 
                 We studied the impact of peer-to-peer competition for social 
approval on cooperation in a social dilemma environment. We obtained data 
suggesting that competition for a final reward with signalling value promotes 
pro-social behaviour. In contrast, when the reward has no signalling value, the 
same competition mechanism reduces cooperation in relation to an 












































Baseline ﾠ(0.35) Ice-ﾭ‐cream ﾠ(0.23) Mug ﾠ(0.54) Star ﾠ(0.23)25 
  Our analysis was guided by a model proposed by Holländer (1990), 
who developed equilibria in which positive contributions exchange for social 
approval. The model suggests two key determinants of equilibrium: the 
relative importance of approval utility in overall utility (denoted above by ߠ஺), 
and RQH¶V status orientation (denoted above by ߪ). Our design varied features 
of the environment that we expected to influence the value of those 
parameters. In particular, treatments varied in terms of: (i) the competitive 
environment; (ii) the presence of non-monetary social approval; and (iii) the 
nature of a non-cash reward out of competition. We found that people 
assigned approval and responded to approval differently under different 
treatments, and in a way that is consistent with Holländer (1990).  
Note that other models, such as Kandel and Lazear (1992)
9, share the 
feature that individuals make strategic decisions regarding how much to 
approve (or disapprove, as in Kandel and Lazear) and how much to contribute. 
While both assume that approval (or disapproval) influences contributions, 
Hollander goes further to assume a specific relationship between the way 
approval is assigned and contribution decisions. This allows one to connect 
approval rates to contributions in equilibrium. Moreover, it is worth noting 
that displaying disapproval implies a utility cost LQ.DQGHODQG/D]HDU¶V
model. Consequently, increased cooperation arising from expressions of 
disapproval may not enhance social welfare. 
            We found approval assignment to vary with the nature of the reward 
out of competition. Under competition, approval assignment is based more on 
relative than absolute contributions. Given the same contribution differences, 
absolute approval is withheld the most in Star and least in Mug. This may 
partially explain a lower contribution in all competition treatments except 
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
9 ﾠOther ﾠtheoretical ﾠmodels ﾠ(see, ﾠe.g., ﾠAkerlof ﾠ(1980), ﾠLindbeck ﾠet ﾠal ﾠ(1999)) ﾠalso ﾠdevelop ﾠ
models ﾠthat ﾠcan ﾠincorporate ﾠthe ﾠinfluence ﾠof ﾠpeers ﾠthrough, ﾠfor ﾠexample, ﾠsocial ﾠnorms. ﾠ
However, ﾠeconomic ﾠagents ﾠin ﾠthese ﾠmodels ﾠare ﾠunable ﾠto ﾠuse ﾠeither ﾠapproval ﾠ(as ﾠin ﾠ
Hollander) ﾠor ﾠdisapproval ﾠ(as ﾠin ﾠKandel ﾠand ﾠLazear) ﾠto ﾠinfluence ﾠsocial ﾠnorms. ﾠRather, ﾠnorms ﾠ
in ﾠtheir ﾠmodels ﾠemerge ﾠthrough ﾠherding, ﾠreciprocity ﾠor ﾠtypes ﾠof ﾠsocial-ﾭ‐learning. ﾠ26 
Mug, where competition may drive attention towards a spiteful withholding of 
approval rather than creating a healthy competition for higher contributions.    
           This higher cooperation level in Mug is consistent with higher utility 
associated with each unit of approval. The result is D³NHHSing up with the 
-RQHVHV´FRQWULEXWLRQFRPSHWLWLRQLQMug. On the other hand, cooperation in 
Star is lower than in Baseline, which appears to indicate that competition 
absent rewards with signaling value is detrimental to cooperation.   
               It is worthwhile to note that positive contributions in games with 
valuable final rewards are not necessarily inconsistent with a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium in which agents maximize their monetary payoff, so long as 
agents place sufficient value on ice-cream or a mug. We found, however, that 
WTP is identical between these rewards. This means that while DUHZDUG¶V
value to any particular subject could potentially rationalize WKDWVXEMHFW¶V
contributions, it cannot explain the substantial differences we observe between 
the Mug and Ice-cream treatments.  
                 As Holländer (1990) argued, approval¶VLPSDFWRQ contributions is 
consistent with the positive emotional impact of approbation (see also Fehr 
and Gätcher 2000, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). In a standard public goods 
game, the negative emotion from cooperators may help to generate a collapse 
of cooperation over time. Indeed, it is perhaps surprising that the contribution 
momentum in Mug was sustained to the ninth round. This is particularly true 
in light of the presence of systematic low-contributors, as well as substantial 
theoretical and empirical evidence that free-riding is contagious (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2003; Fischbacher et al., 2001). The proximate mechanism behind 
sustained contributions may also work through an emotion mechanism. While 
cooperators express frustration with free-riders in a standard public goods 
game by reducing their contributions, approval from free-riders may help to 
appease cooperators. In particular, free-riders can reciprocate by assigning 27 
approval to cooperators, thereby increasing the chance that a cooperator 
receives a mug reward .  
               Our paper is limited in that it investigates only non-cash rewards 
with small monetary value. Previous scholars have suggested that cash 
rewards have non-monotonic effects on pro-social behaviors (Gneezy and 
Rustichini 2000).  Therefore, it might be interesting for further studies to 
measure the efficacy of non-cash rewards with alternative monetary values. 
Additionally, while rewards were distributed privately in our environment
10, a 
public reward, particularly one with signaling value, may serve to further 
promote cooperation (Andreoni and Petrie 2004, Rege and Telle 2004).  
             Our research demonstrates that the value of social approval is high in 
environments with competition for displayable rewards. This promotes 
cooperation due to a direct effect on preferences as well as an indirect effect 
arising from a change in the process by which people assign and value 
approval. In particular, it appears that a competitive environment shifts the 
approval assignment so that it is based more on relative than absolute 
contributions. At the same time, it increases the value an individual places on 
the approval they receive.  
             Finally, our results shed light on how to construct institutions aimed at 
enhancing the value of decentralized social approval, thereby promoting 
cooperation. For example, in a team environment with moral hazard where it 
is difficult to implement centralized monitoring, introducing social 
competitions for rewards with signaling value may help to foster pro-social 
behaviors in an efficient and positive way. In this sense, our study has 
highlighted D³KLGGHQEHQHILW´RIH[WULQVLFLQFHQWLYHV 
 ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ
10 ﾠTo ﾠavoid ﾠexperimenter ﾠdemand ﾠeffect ﾠ(our ﾠwillingness-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐pay ﾠelicitation ﾠalready ﾠcontrolled ﾠ
for ﾠalternative ﾠexplanations ﾠfor ﾠcontribution ﾠdifferences ﾠbetween ﾠIce-ﾭ‐cream ﾠand ﾠMug ﾠ
treatments). ﾠ28 
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